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Dec., 1952
One is tempted to be critical of laws-and of those who make
them-when the confusion in administrative practice and pro-
cedure is brought into focus. But this and the accompanying ma-
terials can be of greatest service to the lawyer and citizen simply
by attesting to the present need for reform. Other jurisdictions 8
have led the way out of similar conditions. The success and ben-
efits of standardizing administrative procedure in such jurisdic-
tions are overdue in Colorado.
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
ARTHUR BURKE and STEPHEN REED *
When considering the problem of notice and opportunity to
be heard in rule making sessions of administrative agencies, a
preliminary determination must be made of whether the hearing
is, in reality, a legislative or a quasi judicial hearing.
A quasi judicial hearing must: be preceded by notice and af-
fected parties must be afforded an opportunity to be heard. On
the ther hand, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is
not necessary to give notice to affected parties in a quasi legisla-
tive hearing. "And it [an Administrative Agency] is no more
required to give previous notice of an intent to make a regulation
or to grant a hearing on the merits of the regulation to be adopted
than is the legislature in exercising its lawmaking functions."'
The determination of whether a hearing is quasi judicial or quasi
legislative is of primary importance. To fail to give notice and
opportunity to be heard in quasi judicial hearings would be fatal
error and ground for vacating any determination made at this
hearing. On the other hand, a hearing quasi legislative in character
requires no notice.
As a general statement, it may safely be said that in hearings
which are quasi judicial in nature the findings go to a particular
activity in the past. In addition, they are of specific applicability.
"Adjudication is the imposition of a specific duty in personam,
or of a liability, or the granting of a right or status which is de-
pendent on a previous right or duty determined to exist or to
have existed, or by way of redress or punishment for its violation."
2
It is immediately seen that there is a necessity for notice and op-
portunity to be heard. Where an agency is to investigate the
activities of a particular individual or group of individuals and
the result of the hearing is going to be of specific applicability to
3 Federal Administrative Procedure Act, Public Law No. 404, 79th Congress;
Administrative Procedure Act-Legislative History, Senate Document No. 278,
79th Congress; "A Symposium on State Administrative Procedure", 33 Iowa L.
Rev., 372, (1948) ; Heady, F., Administrative Procedure Legislation in the States
(1952).
• Students, College of Law, University of Denver.
'Morgan v. U. S., 298 U. S. 468.
2Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 82.
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this or these individuals, the idea of fair play dictates that they
should have an opportunity to rebut the evidence against them.
An exhaustive analysis of the right to notice and opportunity to
be heard in quasi judicial determinations may be found elsewhere
in this issue of Dicta.
Distinctions Between Legislative and Judicial Functions
The quasi legislative function of administrative agencies is
of a different character than the quasi judicial function. This
aspect of an agency's function is generally considered to be of gen-
eral applicability and of future effect. The language of the courts
vary, but courts use these terms in one way or another. For ex-
ample: "One if the factors adverted to by the courts in distin-
guishing legislative from judicial action is the element of futurity
in the first and retrospection in the latter." 3 While rules or regu-
lations may be formulated as a result of conditions known to exist,
and while actions which may violate these rules will be subject
to censure in the future, rules are not promulgated to censure the
past activities. "Legislation, it is said, is the creation by the state
of a right (including an authority, a privilege, or an immunity)
duty or status not dependent on the existence of a previous right,
duty, or status." 4 Another aspect of the futurity of legislative
functions is presented by Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon:5
"Legislation . . . looks to the future and changes existing condi-
tions by making a new rule to be applied to the future and changes
existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter
to all or some part of those subject to its power."
The second part of this statement brings us to the second
major distinction between quasi legislative and quasi judicial func-
tions. This is the general applicability of the former and the spe-
cific applicability of the latter. If any hearing is to determine an
application to a specific person or persons falling within an arbi-
trarily drawn class (that is, a class which is not a real or distinct
class based on real differences), then the agency is acting in its
quasi judicial capacity. If, on the other hand, the application is
to all persons or a real class (distinguished on reasonable differ-
ences), then the agency is performing a quasi legislative function.
"Legislative and judicial functions have been distinguished by the
element of generality in the former and particularity in the latter,
that is, legislation operates against a class, and judgments against
individuals." 6 There is a valid reason for this distinction. Where
a person's rights are to be determined in a hearing, he must have
every opportunity to protect these rights. There is no problem
involved in allowing him to be present and listening to his argu-
ments on the case. Where a great many persons are involved, it
is usually not feasible to provide all concerned with notice. Further,
" Mitchell Coal and Coke Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 230 U. S. 247.
4115 A. L. :R. 39, n. 3.
253 U. S. 287.
10San Diego Land and Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439.
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those who are responsible to the legislature (the agencies) are
going to lend an ear to the demands of fair treatment from a large
group. They are going to take cognizance of the views of a large
body of voters whereas they are not going to be so concerned with
the views of a single voter. The individual must then, of practical
necessity, be protected by a requirement of notice and opportunity
to be heard.
We have seen, then, quasi legislative and quasi judicial func-
tions are distinguished on two grounds: the general applicability
of the former as against the specific of the latter. " . . . legislation
operates against a class and judgments against individuals";7 and
the futurity of the former as against the retrospectivity of the
latter, "Legislative power is the power to make, alter, or repeal
law 8 or rules for the future." 9 "A judicial inquiry investigates,
declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past
facts and under laws supposed already to exist." 10
Colorado Court Failed to Recognize Distinction
In 1941 the Colorado Supreme Court decided the case of Smith
Brothers Cleaners and Dyers v. People." In that case the defend-
ant was charged with selling its services at less than the estab-
lished minimum prices, paying its employees less than the minimum
wages, and requiring its employees to work in excess of the estab-
lished maximum number of hours. Smith Brothers claimed that
the act was unconstitutional in that it violated Sections 3 and 25
of Article II of the Colorado Constitution and Section I of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In effect
Smith Brothers claimed that no notice and opportunity to be heard
was given in the hearing to fix prices, as required by the due proc-
ess clause. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Act was a
proper exercise of the police power, and as far as the substantive
jaw was involved the requirements of due process were satisfied.
But then the court fell into error for it held Section 7 of the Act
unconstitutional because it contained no provision requiring notice
and opportunity to be heard.
As said previously, if the application is to all persons or a
real class and concerns future effect, the act is quasi legislative.
The pertinent section of the Act says:
To make investigations and surveys in this State rela-
tive to determining the fair and reasonable average cost
for performing the various services regularly performed
by cleaning and dyeing establishments; to submit all
findings together with a schedule of minimum retail and
wholesale prices based upon such fair and reasonable
average costs to the Industrial Commission for approval,
7 Id.
'Spingir v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189.
Mitchell Coal and Coke Co. v. Penn. R. Co., supra.
10 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210.
108 Colo. 449, 119 P. 2d 623.
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and, when approved, said minimum retail and wholesale
prices shall be binding on every member of the trade
within this State, in that no member of the trade shall
sell or offer to sell any of the services included in such
minimum price schedule at a price which is lower than
the fair and reasonable average cost as established and
approved in the minimum price schedule.
12
As previously seen, no notice and opportunity to be heard is
necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process in quasi leg-
islative hearings. 13 It is necessary then to ascertain whether the
hearing setting a minimum price in the Smith Brothers case is
quasi legislative or quasi judicial in nature. Logical reasoning avails
of no answer, except that the hearing setting the price for cleaners
and dyers in Colorado was legislative in nature, and contrary to the
opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court, required no notice and op-
portunity to be heard. Analyzing the Smith Brothers case in light of
the case of Morgan v. U. S. (supra) there is no pre-existing duty
nor is there an imposition of a liability because of a pre-existing
duty. The hearing determined the duty of a whole class. That is,
there was no specific application, but rather, a general one. There
was, further, no determination of specific past actions. No clean-
ing and dying establishment was being censured for violation of a
past duty (see Prentiss v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra). The
hearing was creating a new duty to affect only the future (see
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon, supra). The hearing in Smith
Brothers was only quasi legislative and, as such, required no notice
or opportunity to be heard.
In considering this problem, however, one is not forced to
rely on only logical analysis. This is ample precedent to sustain
this position. The case relied on by the court in reaching their
decision was Brown v. City of Denver.14 The decision in that case
was correct, but improperly relied upon.
The case of Brown v. City of Denver is readily distinguishable
from Smith Brothers Cleaners and Dyers case. In the Brown case,
the city council passed an ordinance requiring all property owners
to build a sidewalk of certain specifications within sixty days. In
default of their so doing, an authorized contractor was to build a
sidewalk and the city engineer was then to determine the reason-
able cost thereof and to levy a- special assessment in this amount
as a fixed charge against the property. This action of the engineer
was a quasi judicial function. It was applied against specific persons
(Those who failed to build sidewalks) and was predicated on past
violation of the law which required property owners to build side-
walks. The court did not hold that notice should be given before the
rules were made, but only before the judicial hearing making the
fixed charge. In so holding the court said:
"Sec. 7, 3 (e) (1), 1937 S. L., p. 425.
"Morgan v. U. S., 298 U. S. 468.
"17 Colo. 305, 3 P. 455.
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Until the walk is built and a certificate therefor is-
sued.., the owner cannot know the grounds of complaint
... In so far, therefore, as the ordinance provides for
making the cost of construction a special assessment
against the property improved, and for the manner of
collecting the same without notice or hearing, we are of
the opinion that it is . . . invalid.
The court here implies that the special assessment is judicial in
nature because of the specific applicability, and the assessment
may become final only after a judicial determination. The Smith
Brothers case may be readily distinguished from such an attempt
to create a liability on the basis of an already existing duty. The
regulation in the Smith Brothers case merely created a new duty.
The case of Brown v. City of Denver, in actuality, stands for the
proposition that notice and opportunity to be heard in quasi judi-
cial hearings is necessary. Brown v. City of Denver then, is not
authority for the stand taken in the Smith Brothers case.
Price Fixing As Legislative Function
The Colorado Supreme Court has placed an impossible burden
upon state agencies by its decision in the Smith Brothers case.
The Federal District Court of Virginia said, in upholding a milk
price fixing act:
The act contains no directions as to the kind of notice
to be given and evidently merely contemplated notice by
advertisement to the general public. No other notice was
feasible, considering the large number of persons engaged
in production and distribution of milk.15
In another milk price fixing case, the New Jersey court said :16
In the absence of a specific constitutional or statutory
requiremeiit thereof, notice of proceedings before the sub-
ordinate body exercising, as here, the administrative func-
tion is not requisite to valid action by that body. Nor is
a hearing required in the absence of a provision therefor
in the organic or statutory law. The due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no such require-
ment....
In upholding a minimum wage order, the Washington court
said :17
The legislature instead of fixing the minimum wage
and the conditions of labor for women and minors as it
would clearly have the right to without any notice what-
ever to persons affected thereby, has authorized a com-
mission to examine into and determine the facts upon
which the Act may become operative. This we are satis-
fied, may be done without any notice unless notice is re-
quired by the Act governing the Commission.
1 Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 16 Fed. Supp. 575.
" State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179
A. 116.
1" Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 P. 595.
DICTA Dec., 1952
Dec., 1952
It thus seems that the holding of the Colorado Supreme Court
in the Smith Brothers case was unfortunate because price fixing
is clearly a quasi legislative function 18 and, as such, no notice and
opportunity to be heard are necessary.
As the United States Supreme Court said in Bi-Metallic Co.
v. Colorado :19
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few
people it is impracticable that every one should have a
direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not
require all public acts to be done in town meeting or on
assembly of the whole .... There must be a limit to indi-
vidual argument in such matters if government is to go on.
USE OF EVIDENCE IN HEARINGS BEFORE
COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
AL COOTER and ROBERT KELLEY *
It is hardly necessary to call attention to the confusion which
exists with regard to the application of technical rules of evidence
to hearings had before the myriad administrative bodies which
have been created in Colorado. In proceedings before the various
boards, commissions, and agencies there is no homogeneous or
even similar procedure to be followed with regard to the exclusion-
ary rules of evidence. Some of the larger and better known agen-
cies, such as the Public Utilities Commission and the Industrial
Commission, are governed by rather comprehensive statutory re-
quirements which have become well defined by subsequent rules
adopted by these commissions themselves as well as by custom
and prior experience.
Because the list of administrative agencies is continually
growing, the frequency of litigation before these bodies is in-
creasing at a corresponding rate. Adding to that fact the common
knowledge that our society is becoming more and more complex,
the resulting inference is that litigants seeking redress will con-
tinue to grow in number, thus presenting an opportunity and a
duty on the part of the bar to provide adequate representation.
In many cases, the individual who has a grievance or who
has been called before one of the agencies for a violation of some
activity within its control will feel that he does not need an attor-
,3 "Rate making, of course, is a legislative process," Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line, 211 U. S. 210, 226; "In the fixing of rates--a legislative act-the legisla-
ture has a broad discretion which it may exercise directly or through a legisla-
tive agency in accordance with standards prescribed by the legislature," St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38; "Process in the form of a notice
to a corporation to be affected by a contemplated or intended order (as to rate
making) of the commission . . . is neither contemplated nor provided for, ...
nor is essential to the validity thereof," Randall Gas Co. v. Star Glass Co., 88
S. E. 840, 78 W. Va. 252.
"239 U. S. 441.
* Students, University of Denver College of Law.
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